This paper is an updated version of arXiv:math/0606635v2 with new results and proofs. The consistency of the theory of real numbers is a necessary condition for mathematics to be consistent. In this paper, we prove current mathematics is inconsistent by showing directly the inconsistency of the theory of real numbers. In particular, we show current mathematics allows one to obtain numbers that are neither comparable by the less-than relation nor eligible for arithmetic operations.
Introduction
The consistency of the theory of real numbers is a necessary condition for the consistency of mathematics. It is believed that the consistency of the theory of real numbers can be reduced to the consistency of number theory (the theory of natural numbers) [1] . Regarding the consistency of number theory, the work by Gödel [1] and Gentzen [2] may still represent the state of the art.
Gödel's result is neutral: the consistency is neither established nor disproved. Actually, according to Gödel's result, any "finitistic" (in the sense of Hilbert) proof of the consistency expressible within number theory is impossible. Gentzen's result is positive. But Gentzen's methods are not finitistic, and the consistency of such methods is doubtful [1] .
We shall prove directly the inconsistency of the theory of real numbers, which implies the inconsistency of current mathematics. In particular, we shall demonstrate the following. From current mathematics, results contradicting some axioms in the theory of real numbers are deducible. The axioms in the theory of real numbers mentioned above are as follows: any two different real numbers are comparable by the less-than relation <, and all real numbers are eligible for arithmetic operations (but 0 is not a divisor).
Inconsistency in the Current Notion of Numbers
Denote by x n a strictly decreasing sequence of positive real numbers, i.e., for n = 1, 2, · · ·, x n > x n+1 and x n > 0. Let a be the limit of
Theorem 1 There is a term x ′ of x n , such that x ′ and a are not comparable by the relation <, and hence are not eligible for subtraction.
Proof: Write E = {x : x is a term of x n } and A = E ∪ {a}. The limit a of x n is the only accumulation point of E [1] . The set A is the closure of E, and is a closed set [1] .
Denote by R the set of all real numbers. Denote by A c the complement of A.
As the complement of a closed set A, the set A c is an open set, and is a union of a countable collection I of disjoint open intervals [1] .
Both set A and collection I are fixed on the real line. 1 Each open interval I ∈ I is either infinite with one finite endpoint, or has two different finite endpoints. A finite endpoint of any I ∈ I is not in any interval in I, and hence is an element of A. So all finite endpoints of open intervals in I are the elements of A.
There is an I 0 ∈ I, such that I 0 = (−∞, a). So inf{|x − y| : x ∈ I 0 , y ∈ ∪ I∈I, I =I 0 I} = inf{|x − y| : x ∈ I 0 , y ∈ I, I ∈ I, I = I 0 } = 0 and hence there is an I 1 ∈ I with inf{|x − y| : x ∈ I 0 , y ∈ I 1 } = 0.
The lower endpoint of I 1 is a. Actually, such I 1 ∈ I with inf I 1 = a is a consequence of the result below.
inf I∈I, I =I 0 I = inf{y : y ∈ I, I ∈ I, I = I 0 } = a.
There is yet another way to see this: The total length l of all finite I ∈ I is x 1 − a, and hence there is a finite I 1 ∈ I, such that inf I 1 coincides with a. This perfect fit (inf I 1 coinciding with a) is the only case for l = x 1 − a to hold [1] . Let x ′ ∈ A represent the upper endpoint of I 1 . So a < x ′ . But a < x ′ implies a contradiction as shown below. Write δ = x ′ − a. If a < x ′ , then δ > 0. Since a is the accumulation point of E, by the definition of accumulation point [1] , there should be infinitely many x ∈ E with |x − a| = x − a < δ, i.e., such x are in I 1 = (a, x ′ ). But x − a < δ does not hold for any x ∈ E, i.e., there is no x ∈ E in I 1 , since E ⊂ A, and since
On the other hand, it is impossible for x ′ to be less than or equal to a, since a is the limit of a strictly decreasing sequence in which x ′ is a term [1] . So x ′ and a are not comparable by the relation <, and hence not eligible for subtraction. Q.E.D.
Theorem 1 demonstrates the inconsistency in the current notion of numbers, which implies the inconsistency of current mathematics. As shown in the proof of Theorem 1, the inconsistency in the notion of numbers manifests itself through a contradiction implied by the definition of accumulation point.
Like any established mathematical result, Theorem 1 is a logical consequence of current mathematics. It is easy to find counterexamples to Theorem 1. For instance, the definition of accumulation point (which is actually an assumption disguised as a definition) and the Axiom of Archimedes [1] are obvious counterexamples. However, in an inconsistent system, counterexamples cannot negate any statement deducible from the system. A counterexample to a deducible statement in such a system only indicates the inconsistency of the system.
According to Peano's axioms [1] , any natural number (positive integer) greater than 1 is a result of the operation "adding 1 to itself recursively". But a natural number n ′ > 1 is deducible from Theorem 1, such that "adding 1 to itself recursively" cannot yield n ′ .
Corollary 1 There is a natural number n ′ > 1, such that n ′ is not the result of "adding 1 to itself recursively". By Theorem 1, there is some term x ′ = 1/n ′ of 1/n , such that 1/n ′ and 0 are not comparable by the relation <. So n ′ is not an eligible divisor (otherwise 1/n ′ and 0 would be comparable), and hence "adding 1 to itself recursively" cannot yield n ′ (otherwise n ′ would be an eligible divisor). Q.E.D.
